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Abstract 
 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO), one of the most widely used financial operations for a 
firm to raise capital, has a major impact on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), even 
more than for other companies, given their usual financial constraints. 
Using a sample of IPOs taking place in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a 
survival analysis was conducted with the objective of studding the ex-ante characteristics 
that have a significant impact in the company’s survival after the IPO. Our results show 
that penny stocks are keener to failure as well as stocks listing during bull cycles. 
Additionally, income statement related variables show irrelevant importance for survival, 
while balance sheet related variables appear to have a significant impact, with companies 
with lower debt and positive net cash showing higher propensity for success. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the most widely used financial operations for 
a firm to raise capital, becoming the subject of enormous attention given the well-known 
effect of underpricing (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990).  
Although, most of the literature regarding this subject is concentrated on big companies 
and consequently on major stock exchanges, this financial operation is often used also by 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and has a more significant impact on them. 
The present dissertation intends to study the IPO of SMEs, more specifically the factors 
that contribute for the success or failure of the company when it goes public. As so, it is 
the objective of this study to find the characteristics, successful and unsuccessful 
companies have when they go public, in order to get a better perspective of the future 
performance of an SME at the time of the IPO. 
This study will be focused on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), the hottest 
market for IPOs of SMEs worldwide. The AIM, within junior markets, experienced the 
most accentuated growth in the past years of foreign firms listing, as shown in Figure 1 
(Nielsson, 2013), representing an outstanding increase in its competitiveness. 
Additionally, AIM is the stock exchange for SMEs with the higher market capitalization 
worldwide, as highlighted in Table 1 (Nielsson, 2013). 
Figure 1 – Number of foreign firms listed 1995-2009 (Nielsson, 2013). 
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Table 1 – Number of firms and market capitalization – December 2009 (Nielsson, 2013). 
 
In Europe 99% of the companies are SMEs, being therefore the engine of the European 
economy. AIM is by far the most important growth equity market in Europe, becoming 
this way the best market to study the success and failure characteristics of SMEs that go 
public. 
By examining the characteristics of success, SMEs will be able to see if they are ready to 
go public and get an estimate of the life cycle they’re in, in order to grow with the aid of 
the equity capital markets. 
 
1.2 Relevance and Motivation 
According to Fama and French (2004), in the heart of the modern capitalism lies the 
market for publicly traded equity, representing the will of investors to bear residual 
corporate risks. Preceding the public equity market, the market for newly listed firms is 
the point of entry which allows the firms wide access to equity capital and, consequently, 
make possible their emergence and growth. 
Small and medium companies present more often financial constrains than large 
companies (Samitas and Kenourgios, 2005). The 2008 global crisis made it even more 
difficult for companies to finance themselves. This phenomenon was well documented in 
euro area firms, and specially felt by SMEs as euro area banks tightened severely credit 
standards on loans to non-financial companies (Artola and Genre, 2011). This problem is 
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not completely solved in Europe, (where some countries are still under international 
financial aid programs), despite the quantitative easing (QE) measures taken by the ECB. 
Accessing the stock market is a way to surpass the financial constrains (Kim, 1999). 
However, according to St-Pierre (2000), the decision of going public is much more 
complex and important for an SME than for a big company.  Despite the listing rules, 
SMEs have great difficulties to stabilise their performance and satisfy their investors. 
Given the small amount of stocks available, each transaction has a major impact in the 
stock price and, consequently, shareholder’s return. Anyhow, after going public, 
performing well is fundamental for growth SMEs as it’s highly probable they’ll have to 
go to the market to finance themselves several times in order to keep their growth. In this 
line of thought, Schneider et al. (1983) highlighted that a good market performance allows 
a firm to get more favourable rates in loans, and maintain its capacity to go to the equity 
market to refinance itself. 
Although IPOs are a topic very well studied and documented, the gap in the literature 
regarding IPOs of SMEs is wide, concrete results concerning success and failure are very 
scarce and only studied in a very limited way. In fact, only a few studies, very recently, 
deepen some aspects of IPOs of SMEs with particular accuracy. Three of the most 
important studies this work are: i) Capentier and Suret (2010), who analyse the survival 
and success of Canadian penny stocks, (which is not surprising given the fact that the 
TSX Ventures is the stock exchange for SMEs with more companies in the world), ii) 
Espenblaub et al. (2012) who analysed AIM IPOs with a major focus in the reputation of 
the financial advisor, among several other characteristics, and iii) Nielsson (2013) who 
deeply studied the AIM trying to understand if this market, being less regulated, attracted 
lower quality firms than markets with tougher rules. 
IPOs can be a crucial operation and probability one of the most important steps, if not in 
many cases the most important, an SME will take during its life. Considering the financial 
constrains in Europe, going public can be an even more attractive operation to raise 
capital. As so, it is important to understand what dictates the success and failure of the 
company after this financial operation.  
This is exactly what this study proposes: identify the company’s characteristics at the time 
of the IPO that contribute to the company’s success or failure after the IPO. 
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After this introductory chapter, the present work continues in Chapter 2 with the literature 
review around the theme. Chapter 3 provides all the information regarding the 
methodologies used, the sample and all the variables. All the results were presented and 
discussed in Chapter 4. Lastly, Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions of the study. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The Alternative Investment Market 
AIM is the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) international market for smaller growing 
companies. Founded in 19th of June 1995, more than 3000 worldwide companies joined 
AIM, from early stage or venture capital backed companies to well established 
companies, in order to raise capital for their expansion.  
According to Gajewski and Gresse (2006), AIM is governed only by the LSE, meaning 
that it is beyond the direct reach of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Considering 
European regulations, AIM is considered a Multi-Trading Facility and is exempted from 
the Prospectus Directive. 
The requirements to list in AIM are very loosen, as shown in Table 2. A firm does not 
need to meet any industrial characteristic or any minimum equity size, floating 
capitalisation or age. It is not mandatory to raise funds when going public and the lock-
up periods are not imposed by the exchange. There is a special category of underwriters, 
the Nominated Advisors (Nomads), on which the admission authority is delegated. The 
Nomads, appointed and controlled by the LSE according to rigorous criteria, co-ordinate 
the due-diligence process, produce and approve admission documents and implement 
Floatation. On AIM, three days after the Nomad confirms that the firm is suitable for 
listing, the company is admitted. 
Table 2 – Comparison of listing rules (Espenblau et al., 2012). 
 
Rules on AIM LSE Main Market OTCQX US Nasdaq
Public float No minimum required Minimum 25% of shares 
in public hand
No minimum required 300 shareholders; 1mn 
shares publicly held with 
minimum market value 
between $4-5 mn
Trading record None required Three years trading 
record required
None required 0-2 years trading record
Minimum market capitalization No minimum required Minimum £10 million 
market capitalization
Minimum $5 million 
market capitalization
Minimum $50 million 
market capitalization
Profitability No minimum 
requirement
No minimum 
requirement
No minimum 
requirement
No minimum or $750k 
net income depending 
on listing standard
Role of advisors Nomiated adisor Nomad 
required for all 
transactions at and post-
IPO
No such requirement Designated Advisor for 
Disclosure DAD 
required for all 
transactions at and post-
IPO
No such requirement
Admission documents Admission documents 
not examined by UKLA
Admission documents 
inspected by UKLA
Admission documents 
not examined by US 
SEC
Admission documents 
examined by US SEC
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2.2 Post-IPO survival 
Previous to the AIM there was a stock exchange (the UK Unlisted Securities Market – 
USM) with similar characteristics that, essentially, gave place to the AIM as it is known 
nowadays. Hutchinson et al. (1988), in a pioneer work, studied the financial 
characteristics of small firms that achieved quotation in the USM, with the objective to 
understand if these firms were different from smaller firms which do not reach quotation 
and to understand if the USM was providing access to the capital market for growth small 
firms. The authors found important differences between the two groups of companies, 
namely the sales growth rate, the use of debt financing, and the level of liquid assets. The 
group of firms that achieved USM quotation presented higher growth rate, used more debt 
financing and invested less in current assets than the group of small firms which have not 
achieved USM quotation. Regarding the access to capital in the market for the growth of 
small firms, the role played by the USM was positive. The small firms that achieved 
quotation were really growth small firms, as evidenced by their growth rate, their high 
gearing and low liquidity (indicative of the financial stress of growth). 
Later on, St-Pierre (2000) investigated if it was possible to predict the success of recently 
listed firms utilizing the information from the offering prospectus. The sample used 
consisted in 94 Quebec companies with less than 500 employees that went public between 
1983 and 1988 on the Montreal Stock Exchange (the author criticized the data stating that 
the sample is not representative of the population). Size of the firm, debt level, ROA and 
the percentage of voting shares sold by managers at the time the firms goes public were 
analysed. The results of the study, not surprisingly, were inconclusive and scarce. 
However, the author finds, in line with previous literature, that the age of the firm, voting 
rights sold by managers, sales growth potential and the subscription price could be good 
predictors in the stock market of the long-term performance. 
One of the most relevant studies for this present work was developed by Carpentier and 
Suret (2011). The authors analysed the survival and success of a significant sample of 
Canadian penny stocks (market value under US 10$ million) IPOs from 1986 to 2003, 
with the intention to find the economic consequences of allowing access to the stock 
market to small and unprofitable firms – trade-off between listing requirements and 
market quality. 
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Non-surviving firms were considered all the firms “whose stocks were delisted by the 
exchange or subject to an issuer cease trade order at the time of the analysis, along with 
failed companies that are not yet delisted, those whose stocks are only traded OTC or 
NEX and any stock which is used as a shell for a reverse takeover”, also a “stock which 
maintains a price lower than CAN$0.1 for seven consecutive months” and firms acquired. 
Success is considered when a firm upgrades from a junior market to a senior market 
(TSXV to TSX) and when a company enters into merges with another.  
The failure or success of a company was studied considering at the time of the IPO, 
revenues, positive earnings, shareholder’s equity over the threshold of CAN $25 million 
and the initial listing requirements. Additionally, it was studied the impact of the 
intervention of venture-capitalists (VCs), prestigious auditors and prestigious investment 
bankers. As for control variables the authors used the age of the firm, size, industrial 
sector and the time of listing (hot issue markets). The results, summarized in Table 3, 
suggest that the level of listing requirements strongly influence their propensity to fail, 
but have little or none impact on their propensity to succeed. Carpentier and Suret (2011) 
also study the probability of failure and success (with a Kaplan-Meier estimator) and the 
time to failure and to success (with proportional hazard regressions). The conclusions are 
vague, nevertheless suggested that the probability of success of the firm is not linked to 
its financial situation at the time it goes public, and that the time to success present a weak 
relation with the characteristics of the issuers at the IPO. 
Table 3 – Summary of results (Carpentier and Suret, 2011). 
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Espenlaub et al. (2012) studied the new listings in the AIM in order to determine the time 
of survival of IPOs considering the impact of the reputation of the Nomad. In this study 
the authors used a sample of the IPOs from 1995 until 2014 (918 IPOs in total), and 
tracked the results until the end of the year 2010. The authors considered survivor 
companies as those who “continue to be traded on AIM or transfer to another market” 
and by implication non-survivors as companies that “were delisted from Aim trading due 
to liquidation, merger/acquisition, permanent suspension or for any other reason except a 
move to another market”. Additionally, it was also made a distinction between companies 
delisting by reason, namely due to merger/acquisitions and other. Although the focus of 
this study concerned the reputation of the Nomad, the authors analysed the impact of the 
age of the firm, size, initial returns, public float, insider ownership, revenues, VCs, market 
cycle and sector. 
The results suggested that the reputation of the Nomad (measured by the number of deals, 
proceeds of previous years, credit score, profitability and age)  has a significant positive 
impact in IPO survival, companies survive longer (around two years) than those backed 
by other Nomads. Additionally, it was found that the rates of survival in AIM are similar 
to those in North American IPOs, (with the Kaplan-Meier approach the authors observed 
that median survival time was 80 months). Regarding other variables, by using and 
Accelerated Failure Time method as well as the Cox Hazard model, the authors found 
that companies that did a IPOs in hot cycles have more propensity to fail and that age and 
firm size impact positively survival times. 
Very recently, Nielsson (2013) studied AIM questioning if less regulated markets 
attracted lower quality firms, providing with its study a very important insight of the 
survival of companies that decide to go public in that stock exchange. For this study the 
author used a sample period of 1995 until 2009, which included 1,469 companies. The 
results suggest that firms that list in the AIM are of the same quality as the ones that list 
in other places in Europe or in the US. Firms are only smaller in a matter of size, but 
equivalent in terms of profitability, growth and leverage, among others. Additionally, the 
failure rate among the AIM is similar to other markets, firms listed on AIM present higher 
market valuation (when measured in terms of Tobin’s q). Lastly the author found that 
firms in AIM raise proportionally higher amounts of money. Besides the conclusions, the 
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study provides an important insight concerning the future of all the companies that listed 
on AIM, presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 – Delistings from UK AIM (Nielsson, 2013). 
 
 
2.3 Market Performance 
Considering market performance, the literature is naturally wider. After listing, Jain and 
Kini (1994) verified that the operational performance of the company falls significantly, 
possibly due to three reasons: overlap of good operating performance of the company 
with the time of the offering; window dressing or increase of agency problems with 
dispersion of ownership.  
McConaughy et al. (1995) verified an increase in operational performance only after five 
of six years after the IPO, whereas Mikkelson et al. (1997) found that not only the age, 
but also the size of the company had an impact in the company operating performance.  
Young and Zaima (1998) investigated if there was a positive risk-return relationship for 
small firm aftermarket returns (higher risk, higher aftermarket return), but only found a 
positive link between the age of the firm and the stock yields, aftermarket performance 
of older firms is favourable. Additionally, the authors searched for an industry effect, but 
did not found any statistically significant relation. 
 
2.4 External Strengths and Liabilities 
Externalities can have a major impact on the company after the IPO, as already 
highlighted in Carpentier and Suret (2011). Gulati and Higgins (2003) studied the 
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influence of VC firms, investment banks and strategic alliance partnerships in SMEs at 
the time they go public. During cold markets, the impact of VCs is very positive and, in 
other hand, during hot markets the impact of investment bankers may be very positive. 
Strategic alliances did not suggest any impact. The definition of success used lies only in 
financial indicators and the sample concerns the specific sector of biotechnology. 
Bach et al. (2008) studied the role of superior knowledge and isolation mechanisms, 
defining success as the market value created in the venture up to the point of the IPO. The 
results suggest that superior knowledge of the top management team is an important 
determinant of IPO success, as well as the patent protection and the new ventures 
reputation. The tests were made in a 103 US computer related SMEs sample that went 
public until 1997. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Failure and Success  
The definitions of failure and success of the IPO provided in the literature are wide, 
different authors use different definitions according to the characteristics they intend to 
study. 
One of the first and most important definitions of success of IPOs of SMEs is provided 
by St-Pierre (2000). The author links success to market performance, considering a 
company has a successful operation and performance when the stocks yields have a 
positive growth. 
Gulati and Higgins (2003), when studying the inter-organizational relationships of young 
firms at the time of the IPO, measured success according to four different financial 
measures, that highlighted the success of the operation itself (in the short term). First they 
used the firm’s net proceeds (amount raised at the IPO less costs incurred), second the 
pre-money market valuation (widely employed indicator), third and fourth were the 90-
day market valuation and 180-day market valuation after the IPO.  
Audretsch and Lehmann (2005), evaluating the effects of experience, ownership, and 
knowledge on IPO survival, used a very simple proposition to define the success of the 
company after the IPO, survival was the meaning of success. 
Another simple proposition is presented by Jain et al. (2008), using company profitability 
after the IPO as a measure of success. 
Bach et al. (2008), studying the knowledge-based capabilities in a high-technological 
industry of IPO companies, defined success as the “creation of market value above and 
beyond the resources invested in the venture since its inception”. 
Carpentier and Suret (2011) identify the success as a stock exchange “graduation”, an 
upgrade of the one proposed by Audretsch and Lehmann (2005), meaning the passage of 
the firm listing in a stock exchange with low listing requirements to a senior stock 
exchange with more restrictive listing requirements, in this case from AIM to LSE. It is 
important to refer that this criterion is also used by stocks exchanges as well to measure 
success. 
 12 
The definition of success adopted in the present work is the one defined by Espenblau et 
al. (2012), simply considering that a stock continues to trade on AIM or it graduates.  
Measuring success for small and newly listed firms is very discussable in any case and it 
is far from consensus. Market-adjusted returns can be very deceiving since stocks usually 
present low trading volume and high volatility. The growth rates of earnings or revenues, 
when they are initially inexistent, are worthless. Profitability can only be used when the 
firms report positive earnings at the time of the IPO. Nevertheless, the graduation process 
also has some setbacks. Not all the companies that have the conditions to graduate go to 
a senior stock exchange, for several reasons, but mainly because they’ll have to pay higher 
fees and taxes. This situation may blur the success companies achieved since they went 
public. The other way back is also visible, some companies listed in a senior stock 
exchange “downgrade” (passing from LSE to AIM) in order to reduce the fees and taxes 
paid, which does not mean necessarily the company failed or is failing. 
On the other hand, failure is assumed as all the opposite events that define success. 
According to Figure 2, includes voluntary exit with good stock returns (well-established 
reasons), voluntary exit with bad stock returns (firms exit before being obliged to do it), 
involuntary exit (failure to raise necessary capital, failure to keep every time a Nomad, 
failure to comply with AIM rules, among others) and M&A.  
Mergers and acquisitions are the most sensible and discussable subjects regarding 
success. Acquisitions are considered a failure, following the reasoning that the company 
failed to run its business in the most efficient way and therefore was bought. Mergers are 
a more particular case, and follow the reasoning indicated by AIM, considering them as 
“reverse takeovers”. This kind of operations usually consists in a take-over of a non-listed 
company larger in size, that lead to major restructuring of the listed firm. There may be a 
change in the main function of the company, and therefore a change in the firm identity. 
Additionally, there may be new equity issues by the new firm to finance the operation 
and a new board (with members of the precedent non-listing company). Thus, the original 
firm is still running and listed in the AIM, but now with a new identity. Therefore, a 
merger is considered a negative event and consequently a failure as delisting. 
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3.2 Sample  
The sample used in this study is constituted by 327 IPOs occurred in AIM from 1999 
until 2010, of which 57 represent failures and 270 represent success. From the total 
companies with IPOs on AIM in this period, it was necessary to exclude all the stocks 
that were already trading in different markets and all the stocks with unavailable data. 
The availability of information was a major constrain of this study, leading the sample to 
be significantly reduced in comparison to the effective number of IPOs in the period of 
reference. In order to track the failure event companies were given at least three years of 
market performance (common time usually adopted in the literature), with the maximum 
date to be at the end of the year 2013.  
All the information used came from three sources, Datastream, LSE and Google Finance. 
All the financial data was provided by Datastream namely, revenues, EBITDA, EBIT, net 
income, total assets, total debt and cash. Google Finance was used to define the market 
cycle according to FTSE100. The information from LSE was used to access the sector, 
country of incorporation, the stock issue price and the time to failure. It should be noticed 
that the time to failure was the most difficult variable to define (as there were several data 
overlaps and inconsistencies), therefore it was only used data from companies where there 
was an absolute certain of the correctness of dates of entry and exit, always cross-checked 
with Datastream financial data. 
For the specific case of companies which graduate (almost neglectable number in the 
sample considered), it was considered the stocks continued to trade until the end of the 
period of reference. 
At last, it is important to refer that within the 327 companies that constitute the sample in 
study, the variables are not fully available for all of them, constraining the number of 
variables used when studied separately and in a model (where the combination of all data 
availability was a more important impact). 
 
3.3 Models 
Survival analysis is a statistical procedure used to analyse a positive random variable, 
normally, the time to occurrence of a response of interest, or event, (in this case, failure 
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or success). This technique analyses the time of permanence of an element in its current 
state, so that it is possible to identify the variables that have an impact in the time to a 
response of interest. This methodology allows to consider the length of time a company 
survives, unlike the Logit and Probit methodologies that provide only binary information, 
whether a company survives or not. 
Another characteristic of these models relies on the fact that they non-normal distributions 
in order to cope with “censored” data (even of interest is not observed during the period 
in study). In the present study the sample is “right censored” if the companies survive 
until the end of the period of reference (end of December 2013).  
Within survival analysis there are two types of widely used methodologies, the Acelerated 
Failure Time models (AFT) and the Cox Hazard model. While in the first the risk is 
variable along time, the Cox Hazard model assumes that risk is constant, (given two 
observations, i and j, the risk rate ratio is a constant and the risk rates are proportional). 
Mathematically the dependent variable of the Cox Hazard model measures the risk of 
failure whereas the AFT measures the survival time. As risk variations are not relevant 
for the proposed objectives, the survival method applied was the Cox Hazard model. 
 
3.3.1 Cox Hazard Model 
The Cox Hazard model is used to model the time to failure and time to success of the 
IPO. The adption of this model relies on the great adavantage of not being necessary to 
assume anything about the underlying distribution of the data, which makes the model 
semi-parametric. The general form of the survival function is defined by Equation (1). 
𝑆 (𝑡) = 𝑝𝑟 (𝑇 > 𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹 (𝑡)                                           (1) 
 
Where 𝑇 is the length of the listing period on the original stock exchange. This expression 
represents the likelihood that a firm will continue to be in existence at time 𝑡, given the 
baseline rate of survival among observed firms and other characteristics that vary over 
time, if it has been in operation continuously in prior periods. 
The time to success/failure distribution function is defined in Equation (2). 
𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑟 (𝑇 ≤ 𝑡)                                                   (2) 
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The probability that an IPO issued at t=0 stays on this stock exchange (before delisting or 
graduation) longer than time t is a cumulative density function, measured from t to 
infinity, as defined by Equation (3). 
𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑑𝐹(𝑡)/ 𝑑𝑡                                                   (3) 
The hazard rate, defined in Equation (4), measures the conditional probability that the 
IPO is “dead” instantaneously given that it has survived up to time 𝑡. 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
∆𝑡→0
(
𝑝𝑟 (𝑡 ≤𝑇 <𝑡+ ∆𝑡 | 𝑇 ≥𝑡)
∆𝑡
) =  
𝑓 (𝑡)
𝑆 (𝑡)
=  − 
𝑆′(𝑡)
𝑆 (𝑡)
                           (4) 
 
Although it is possible to model time to success and time to failure with the previous 
equations, according to Cox and Oakes (1984) it is more advantegous to rewritte the 
problem as the Equation (5) bellow.  
ℎ(𝑡|𝑋) =  ℎ0(𝑡) exp (𝑋
′𝛽)                                           (5) 
Where: 
ℎ0(𝑡) - is the base-line hazard; 
𝑡 - is the time to success or failure; 
𝑋 - is a vector of independent variables; 
𝛽 - is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  
The parameter 𝛽, that measures the coefficients that describe how each variable affects 
the time to success and time to failure,  can be obtained from the relative orderings of the 
times to success or failure, rather than actual values (partial likelihood approach). 
The base-line hazard function,  ℎ0(𝑡), which represents the underlying hazard for all 
variables with covariates equal to zero (𝑋 = 0), is not necessary to specify. Parameters 
can be estimated without it, once it is used the partial likelihood function to infer 𝛽 . 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the results obtained by this model are of a 
counterintuitive reading. A positive coefficient results in a hazard ratio greater than one, 
meaning that an increase in the covariate increases the failure rate (or reduces survival 
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time. Whereas a negative coefficient results in a hazard ratio smaller than one, meaning 
that an increase in the covariate reduces the failure rate (or increases survival time). 
 
3.3.2 The Kaplan-Meier Estimator 
In order to estimate the survival rates of the companies in the sample, it was also adopted 
the Kaplan-Meier Estimator as defined below in Equation (6). 
?̂?(𝑡) =  ∏
𝑛𝑖−𝑑𝑖
𝑛𝑖
𝑡𝑖 < 𝑡                                                       (6) 
Where: 
?̂?(𝑡) – is the survival function; 
𝑛𝑖 – is the number of firms at risk at the beginning of time 𝑡𝑖; 
𝑑𝑖 – is the number of firms who fail during time period 𝑡𝑖. 
This model, based on the survival history of all the sample, provides the probability of a 
firm to survive at the time 𝑡. 
 
3.4 Explanatory Variables 
The main variable in study in the present work is time to failure (expressed in months) of 
an SME since its IPO in the AIM. In case of companies being still alive and, therefore, 
data is not censored, the time variable represents the interval between the IPO date and 
the last day of 2013. The time interval of IPOs is from 1999 to 2010 (included) and the 
time differential of at least 3 years concerns the time it was assumed necessary for a given 
company to perform in the market and also to be consistent with the time windows 
broadly used in the literature for similar studies (usually 3 to 5 years is used).  
Given the significant constrains in data availability and gathering, it was only used a 
limited set of variables after running some initial tests, which were divided into three 
distinct categories, General variables, P&L (income statement) variables and Balance 
Sheet variables. 
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3.4.1 General Variables 
The set of General variables comprehend all the variables used in the study that are not 
directly linked to the financial reporting of the companies. They concern a wider view of 
a company characteristics (the sector and country), the market (market cycle) and the IPO 
operation (issue price and money raised), as there are several aspects that affect a 
company’s performance (failure and/or success) besides pure financial ones.  
The company Sector of activity is a dummy variable used to define if the company 
operates in a cyclical or non-cyclical business (the variable assumes the value of 1 if a 
cyclical sector and 0 otherwise). Following the information provided by the LSE 
concerning the several sectors where companies operate, the information was condensed 
in order to facilitate the study, as the objective with the introduction of this variable is to 
verify if a company operating in a riskier business area (as it is consider operating in 
cyclical sector) is more affected and as more propensity to fail. The cyclical sector 
includes financial services, energy, internet, cyclical consumer goods and other smaller 
cyclical sectors, whereas non-cyclical included all the others. The separation between 
cyclical and non-cyclical follows the author’s professional sensitivity and also the broad 
literature on the subject (the Sector where a company operates has been consistently 
studied by several authors in matters of survival, where companies exposed to more 
volatile sectors usually become hurting the most – Espanlaud et al 2012, Carpentier and 
Suret 2011).  
The company Country of incorporation is a dummy variable used to define if the 
company is native from the UK or not (the variable assumes the value of 1 if from UK 
and 0 otherwise). As AIM is a low to inexistent barriers to enter stock market, companies 
from any geography may list there. Following this reasoning, it seems legit to assume that 
lower quality companies that are not able to list in their home country would seek to list 
in the AIM just because it would be (most probably) the only place they could do so. 
Contrary to what it was theorized, Espanlaud et al. (2012) found no evidence of different 
performances between native and foreign companies and Nielsson (2013) also found that 
companies from the US listing in AIM were about the same quality as the ones from 
Continental Europe. 
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The Market Cycle is a dummy variable used to define if the company’s IPO was during 
a bull or bear market (the variable assumes the value of 1 if the IPO occurred during a 
bull market and 0 otherwise). Although it is naturally understood that companies IPOs 
are usually during bull markets (where investors are more willing to invest and pay more 
than in a reversed cycle), it was intended to understand if the market sentiment was 
significant and if companies are more resilient even if listing in downward periods. The 
evolution of FTSE100 during the period of study was used to define if the market was in 
bull or bear phase as it is represented in the Figure 3.  
Figure 3 – FTS100 market evolution from 1998 to 2015 with Market Cycle definitions. 
 
The Issue Price is a dummy variable used to define if the issue stock price is below 10 
GBP (the variable assumes the value of 1 if the issue stock price is higher than 10 GBP 
and 0 otherwise). The utilization of this variable is to understand the penny stock effect 
in a company’s propensity to failure, as usually penny stocks suffer from higher 
speculative movements and are associated with smaller and lower quality firms. The 
definition of penny stock is wide, with authors considering penny stocks all the stocks 
that are listed outside the main markets (which would be the case of AIM) while others 
consider all the stocks that trade bellow 5 USD (SEC definition). In order to better 
accommodate this effect to our database and considering the open listing criteria of AIM, 
we defined a penny stock as a stock that trades with a value below 10GBP. Carpentier 
and Suret (2011) concluded that Canadian penny stocks have lower failure rates than in 
the US for larger IPOs, probably due to more relaxed delisting rules and the market 
capacity to refinance non-profitable firms. 
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The Money Raised variable (log.moneyraided) is a logarithmic variable used to define 
the amount of capital raised by a company in its IPO. The introduction of this variable in 
this study had the objective to infer if the less the company is able to raise more propend 
it is to fail in its business (representative of investor’s lack of confidence in the company). 
The ideal situation would be to use the ratio of money raised over the initial market 
capitalization in order to disregard any size effects (as for instance it is used in Espenblau 
et al, 2012 – evidence that companies that raise more money are keener to survive). 
However, as it was not possible to access all this information, it was used a logarithmic 
scale in order to try to minimize the best as possible any outliers. 
 
3.4.2 P&L Variables 
The P&L variables include revenues, operating profits (EBITDA and EBIT) and net 
results at the time of the IPO or in the closest prior date. 
The Revenue variable (log.revenue) is a logarithmic variable used to measure the sales 
at the time of the IPO. Given the low requirements to list in AIM, it is possible for a 
company to list even in a pre-revenue phase, presenting therefore a higher risk and lacking 
the capacity to finance themselves. Therefore, this variable was used to understand if 
lower revenues in fact are more tilted to failure than others who present high revenues. 
The operating profitability of the company at the time of the IPO was measured trough 
the EBITDA and EBIT, (as D&A and other one-offs may cause significant changes 
downwards the P&L). For EBIT(DA) we used a dummy variable that assumes the value 
of 1 if the EBIT(DA) is positive and 0 otherwise to reflect if the company had positive 
earnings at the time of the IPO or not. Additionally, the operating profit margins were 
also analysed through the use of the EBITDA and EBIT Margins (EBIT(DA)/revenues). 
If the company is struggling already at the operating profit level, usually it presents a 
higher risk profile or it is in an initial phase, requiring therefore external financing. Klein 
and Mohanram (2006) already highlighted that firms with negative or low operating 
profits are keener to failure.  
The last variable studied from the P&L was the Net Income. As in the case of EBIT and 
EBITDA a dummy variable was used to define a positive or negative result, (the variable 
assumes the value of 1 if the net income is positive and 0 otherwise). Similarly, net 
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profitability was measured trough the Net Income Margin (net income/revenues). The 
study of this variable is due to the fact that a company’s profitability is a common metric 
to access the success of a business. Carpentier and Suret (2011) already found evidence 
that unprofitable firms at the time of the IPO are more likely to fail in the future. 
 
3.4.3 Balance Sheet Variables 
The Balance Sheet variables include total assets, total debt, cash and subsequent 
combination of these variables, at the time of the IPO or in the closest prior date. 
The Total Assets variable (log.totalassets) is a logarithmic variable used as proxy for the 
size of the company at the time of the IPO.  The size of a company is widely studied to 
access its relation with success and failure, (as in Hensler et al. 2007, Chou et al 2006, 
Espenblau et al 2012 and Carpentier et al. 2011), where small companies are usually more 
unsuccessful.  
The Total Debt variable (log.totaldebt) is a logarithmic variable used to measure the total 
debt of the company at the time of the IPO. This variable allows to understand the impact 
of the total weight of the liabilities in the company. The introduction of debt and leverage 
is not common in the literature for this type of study. Given that the amount of debt and 
high leverage are usually associated with company hurdles, expectations were for 
innovative results and positive contribution for failure. Additionally, and following the 
same line of thought, the company leverage was measure also by the Total Assets / Total 
Debt ratio (totaldebtta). 
Within the balance sheet, Cash was in focus, although its impact was not only measured 
directly, but also through net debt. Net Debt is a dummy variable (dum.netdebt) that 
assumes the value of 1 if the net debt is positive at the time of IPO and 0 otherwise. The 
ratio Net Debt / Total Assets (netdebtta) is another alternative measure used to access a 
company’s leverage effects. In all cases, an increase in leverage is expected to increase 
the likelihood of failure. Lastly, the ratio Cash / Total Assets (cashta) was used to 
understand the effects of the cash weight on the company’s balance sheet without its size 
bias, where an increase in cash percentage was expected to be associated with a lower 
probability of failure.  
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The following Table 4 resumes and completes all the information previously mentioned 
concerning the variables used in this study. 
Table 4 – Description of all variables used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description # Observations Type Expected Signal
sector Cyclical or non-cyclical sector 327 dummy +
country UK or other country 327 dummy -
marketcycle Bull or bear market cycle 327 dummy +
dum.issueprice Issue stock price >10 327 dummy -
log.moneyraised Logarithm of money raised in the IPO 327 dummy -
log.revenue Logarithm of Revenues 299 logarithm -
dum.ebitda EBITDA positive or negative 321 dummy -
ebitdamg EBITDA margin 225 ratio -
dum.ebit EBIT positive or negative 317 dummy -
ebitmg EBIT margin 221 ratio -
dum.netincome Net Income positive or negative 322 dummy -
netincomemg Net Income margin 231 ratio -
log.totalassets Logarithm of Total Assets 301 logarithm -
log.totaldebt Logarithm of Total Debt 301 logarithm +
totaldebtta Total Debt / Total Assets 301 ratio +
dum.netdebt Net Debt positive or negative 322 dummy +
netdebtta Net Debt / Total Assets 301 ratio +
cashta Cash / Total Assets 301 ratio -
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4. Results 
In order to better understand whether and how the variables influence the survival of the 
companies after the IPO, several survival tests and estimates were developed. First a 
univariate analysis was carried on, followed by a multivariate analysis, where the 
previous variables were combined in different models. Additionally, the Kaplan-Meyer 
method was applied and the survival function results were analysed. 
It is important to recall the counterintuitive reading of the Cox Hazard model results, 
where a positive sign in the coefficient represents an increase in the failure rate, while a 
negative coefficient sign represents a reduction of the failure rate.  
 
4.1 Kaplan-Meier analysis 
With the utilization of the Kaplan-Meier methodology it was possible to define 
graphically the survival function for the whole sample and for the companies who failed, 
as it is presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 – (Left) Distribution function for all companies; (Right) Distribution function 
for non-survival companies. 
 
The analysis of these charts provided a clear view of the failure/survival distribution along 
time for the sample. It is possible to observe that 100% of the companies survive at least 
3 months, a catchy result. From the failing companies (right chart) it is possible to observe 
that 75% of the companies survive 24 months, 50% survive 48 months and 25% survive 
at least 65 months.  Another important observable conclusion relies on the fact that 
companies are keener to failure at a faster rate in the short to medium term than in the 
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long term, (steeper slope of the curve until 45 months, where almost 50% of the 
companies fail, than in the remaining period of time length which is much wider). 
The analysis of the whole sample (left chart), given the small amount of companies it 
comprises and even smaller failure group, is biased by an important “dilutive” effect, 
reflecting the impact of the failures along the period of reference. 
 
4.2 Univariate Cox Hazard models analysis 
The results for the univariate Cox Hazard models estimation are shown in Table 5. The 
majority of the results came in line with expectations in all subdivisions of variables, with 
the General variables group presenting all the results according to the expected signal, 
however with only Market Cycle and the Issue Price variables being statistically 
significance for a significance level of 10% and 1%, respectively. In the case of P&L 
variables none is statistically significant. Finally, within the Balance Sheet variables only 
one is against the expected signal (Total Assets) and two (Total Assets and the ratio Total 
Debt / Total Assets) are not statistically significant.  
Table 5 – Results of univariate Cox Hazard models analysis. 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
 
4.2.1 General variables 
All the results in this variables group came in line with expectations, confirming the 
effects and importance of these variables in the post-IPO performance. However, only 
two presented statistical significance, Market Cycle and Issue Price, highlighting their 
Variable Type Coefficient Std Deviation pvalue Significance # Observations # Failures Expected Signal
sector dummy 0,929 0,720 0,197 0,134  327 57 +
country dummy -0,264 0,405 0,514 0,528 327 57 -
marketcycle dummy 0,815 0,525 0,121 0,082 * 327 57 +
dum.issueprice dummy -0,903 0,266 0,001 0,001 *** 327 57 -
log.moneyraised logarithm -0,323 0,212 0,128 0,123  327 57 -
log.revenue logarithm 0,122 0,086 0,156 0,147  299 48 -
dum.ebitda dummy -0,096 0,277 0,728 0,728 321 53 -
ebitdamg ratio 0,005 0,007 0,497 0,286 225 40 -
dum.ebit dummy -0,092 0,275 0,739 0,739 317 53 -
ebitmg ratio 0,010 0,013 0,437 0,178 221 39 -
dum.netincome dummy -0,233 0,287 0,416 0,411 322 53 -
netincomemg ratio 0,003 0,005 0,545 0,414 231 42 -
log.totalassets logarithm 0,187 0,174 0,283 0,289 301 50 -
log.totaldebt logarithm 0,230 0,075 0,002 0,003 *** 301 50 +
totaldebtta ratio 0,779 0,596 0,191 0,241 301 50 +
dum.netdebt dummy 0,496 0,287 0,083 0,092 * 322 53 +
netdebtta ratio 0,801 0,294 0,006 0,005 *** 301 50 +
cashta ratio -0,789 0,341 0,021 0,014 ** 301 50 -
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influence in survival time while other variables lack statistical support to confirm their 
significant impact. 
The positive sign in the Market Cycle variable confirms that companies that IPO in a Bull 
market are more likely to fail, as these operations normally take place in these periods. 
The negative sign in the Issue Price variable indicates that a penny stock is likely to 
survive less than other stocks, as these stocks are subject to higher speculative moves and 
also associated with smaller and more fragile companies. These results however, came 
against the findings on Canadian penny stocks (Carpentier and Suret, 2011). 
As for the other variables, although not statistical significant in our tests, their coefficient 
signal came in line with expectations. The positive coefficient sign in the Sector variable 
confirms that a company operating in a cyclical sector has a higher failure rate, as risk is 
usually higher in these activities. The negative coefficient sign in the Country variable 
indicates that a company with origin in other country rather than the UK has more 
propensity to fail than a native company. The negative sign in the Money Raised variable 
confirms that companies that raise higher amounts of cash in the IPO are more likely to 
survive longer, representative of the confidence of investors in the company and to 
another extent its size. 
Figure 5 – Survival probability evolution according to the significant dummy variables 
Market Cycle and Issue Price. 
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4.2.2 P&L Variables 
The results of this set of variables were the worst of the three groups analysed, where only 
the dummy variables coefficient signals came in line with expectations. Additionally, not 
a single variable presented statistical significance, setting aside an important contribution 
to survival times. These results are consistent with Carpentier and Suret (2011) that found 
success was not linked to financial conditions at the time of the IPO.  Contrarily, 
Espenblau et al (2012) did found that companies with higher revenues have higher 
survival propensity and also Klein and Mohanram, (2006) found evidence that companies 
with positive earnings are keener to survive longer. It is recognizable tough, that results 
may be biased by constrains of the sample, namely the quality and reduced size for this 
variable. 
 
4.2.3 Balance Sheet Variables 
With the exception of one variable, all the results in this variables group came in line with 
expectations, suggesting a very important impact of this set of variables in the survival of 
a company.  
The only result against expectations and literature came from the non-statistically 
significant variable Total Assets, with a positive coefficient signal suggesting that 
companies of smaller size have higher propensity to survive. Sample constrains, as for 
the variable Revenues, might have caused some bias in this result. Nonetheless, Carpintier 
and Suret (2011) did found that Canadian penny stocks have lower failure rates than in 
the US for larger IPOs.   
Regarding total debt and both its related variables, Total Debt and Total Debt / Total 
Assets (the latest not statistically significant), the positive coefficient signal suggests that 
companies with a higher amount of debt, either in absolute terms or in relative terms to 
its total assets, have higher propensity to fail. Not only the weight of the debt in the 
balance sheet should be noticed in here, but also the importance of the financial charges 
in the P&L that can overcome the company’s capacity of cash flow generation, leaving it 
less prepared to cope with the bumps in the way (fail its payments and bankrupt).  
Concerning net debt and both its related variables, dummy Net Debt and Net Debt / Total 
Assets, the positive signal in both coefficients suggests that companies that are net cash 
 26 
and companies with lower net debt in relation to its total assets have higher propensity to 
survive. 
Figure 6 – Survival probability evolution according to the significant dummy variable 
Net Debt. 
 
Finally, the negative sign on the variable Cash / Total Assets suggests that companies 
with a higher amount of cash within its total assets are more likely to survive. The last 
three variables clearly highlight the importance of an “anti cash-out” financial strategy of 
companies in earlier stages. By having none or little leverage leave, the cash will be “free” 
to invest instead of being used for debt and financial charges payments, allowing the 
companies not only to survive (more prepared to face financial struggles), but also to 
grow. 
This set of variables from the Balance Sheet group presented the higher number of 
statistical significant variables, with a total of four. With these results it was found that a 
sound balance sheet at the time of the IPO is a very important matter that should be taken 
into account when analysing the survival of a company. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Cox Hazard models analysis 
The multivariate analysis comprehends the combination of all the variables previously 
exposed. Several models were developed, the majority of which are reported in the 
annexes. Only the models which were found more relevant to explain the influence of the 
variables in study are presented and properly analysed in this chapter. Following this 
reasoning, Table 6 exposes six models focused in the different variables groups and 
significant variables, while Table 7 exposes four more comprehensive models.  
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Table 6 – Results of multivariate Cox Hazard models analysis (Models 1 to 6). 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
 
Model 1, which includes only the variables within the General group, is statistically 
significant. All the variable’s coefficient signals came in line with the univariate analysis, 
whereas only the Issue Price variable appears statistically significant. These results 
reinforce the importance of the stock price (penny stock or not) in the explanation of the 
survival of a company post-IPO, with companies trading as penny stocks performing 
worse than other stocks. 
Model 2, which includes only the variables within the P&L group, is not statistically 
significant. With the exception of the EBITDA related variables (dummy EBITDA and 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
# Observations 327 221 221 301 301 301
# Failures 57 39 39 50 50 50
χ2 14,800 10,270 4,330 11,390 11,300 22,680
pvalue 0,011 ** 0,174 0,228 0,077 * 0,023 ** 0,001 ***
sector 0,779
(0,723)
country -0,111
(0,407)
marketcycle 0,736 1,058 *
(0,527) (0,603)
dum.issueprice -0,813 ** -0,801 ***
(0,324) (0,292)
log.moneyraised -0,030
(0,248)
log.revenue 0,151 0,115
(0,198) (0,193)
dum.ebitda 0,129
(0,963)
ebitdamg -0,091
(0,069)
dum.ebit -0,290 -0,590
(0,753) (0,372)
ebitmg 0,094 ** 0,013
(0,04) (0,016)
dum.netincome -0,555
(0,697)
netincomemg 0,021
(0,059)
log.totalassets -0,049
(0,197)
log.totaldebt 0,194 0,182 * 0,177 *
(0,122) (0,107) (0,106)
totaldebtta -0,138
(0,887)
dum.netdebt -0,127 -0,140 -0,029
(0,428) (0,412) (0,415)
netdebtta 0,485 0,423 0,569
(0,776) (0,557) (0,559)
cashta -0,070 -0,126 0,217
(0,744) (0,597) (0,613)
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EBITDA mg), all the other variable’s coefficient signals came in line with the univariate 
analysis results. The lack of statistically significance of this model confirms the alleged 
lack of importance of these variables in company’s survival, as seen in the univariate 
analysis. Surprisingly, the EBIT mg variable came statistically significant, although with 
a contrary coefficient signal from expectations. This result could have been attributed to 
sample constrains, however it was noticed that there is a possible multicollinearity bias 
with the net income related variables (as this effect takes place in all the models where 
the EBIT and net income variables coexist). Model 3 was developed to isolate the effect 
from EBIT in the P&L, with both the model and the variables showing no statistical 
significance and, therefore, confirming its lack of importance in our results. Despite the 
discredit of the influence of the EBIT variables, it is important to acknowledge that this 
effect could be possible under the perspective of companies listing in their top cycle 
(where margins peak) along with the top market cycle and window dressing. Additionally, 
it should also be noticed that profitability is a measure that can only be properly used 
when companies report positive earnings at the time of the IPO.  
Model 4, which includes all the variables within the Balance Sheet group, is statistically 
significant. In this six variable model, only three variable’s coefficient signals came in 
line with the univariate analysis results, (namely the Total Debt, Net Debt / Total Assets 
and Cash / Total Assets), and another three variables came in line with expectations 
(namely Total Assets, Total Debt and Cash / Total Assets). Unexpectedly none of them 
is statistically significant, which could have been due to multicollinearity between the 
variables in terms of balance sheet metrics representation. In order to better understand 
the influence of the balance sheet variables Model 5 was developed, a refined version of 
Model 4. Without the variables Total Assets and Total Debt / Total Assets, the model 
presented a higher statistical significance and the variable Total Debt appeared 
statistically significant, confirming the importance of leverage for survival. All the 
coefficient signals remained the same, from one model to the other. In further models 
exposed in this chapter and in the annexes, it was found several times statistical 
significance of some Balance Sheet group variables, suggesting they play an important 
role for a company’s success, as seen in the univariate analysis. 
Model 6, which includes all the statistically significant variables from the univariate 
analysis results, is statistically significant and the one with the best statistical fit. Of the 
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six variables in the model, only dummy Net Debt and Cash / Total Assets coefficient 
signals came opposite to expectations and previous univariate analysis results, although 
not presenting statistical significance, (it is possible, despite the variables “refining”, that 
multicollinearity within balance sheet variables could have biased the results).  Market 
Cycle, Issue Price and Total Debt came in line with expectations and were statistically 
significant, reinforcing their importance for company’s survival. With this model it was 
found that a company that IPO’s in a bull cycle, is a penny stock and has higher debt is 
more likely to fail faster.  
Table 7 – Results of multivariate Cox Hazard models analysis (Models 7 to 10). 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
 
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
# Observations 221 221 225 221
# Failures 39 39 40 39
χ2 38,360 36,620 25,360 26,670
pvalue 0,004 *** 0,001 *** 0,008 *** 0,005 ***
sector 1,204 1,307 0,800 0,787
(0,988) (0,974) (0,7496) (0,748)
country 0,748 1,044 1,030 1,028
(0,874) (0,808) (0,797) (0,811)
marketcycle 0,909 0,880 0,936 0,825
(0,635) (0,634) (0,623) (0,628)
dum.issueprice -0,774 * -0,778 * -0,919 ** -0,760 *
(0,415) (0,416) (0,411) (0,418)
log.moneyraised -0,003 0,047 0,014 0,065
(-0,01) (0,317) (0,315) (0,322)
log.revenue -0,316
(0,237)
dum.ebitda 0,076 -0,120 -0,295
(1,076) (1,003) (0,371)
ebitdamg -0,074 -0,081 0,003
(0,064) (0,061) (0,006)
dum.ebit -0,275 -0,289 -0,523
(0,791) (0,784) (0,386)
ebitmg 0,092 ** 0,092 ** 0,009
(0,038) (0,039) (0,013)
dum.netincome -0,121 -0,059
(0,807) (0,736)
netincomemg -0,002 -0,001
(0,052) (0,049)
log.totalassets 0,165 0,115 0,197
(0,61) (0,213) (0,213)
log.totaldebt 0,280 * 0,260 **
(0,153) (0,132)
totaldebtta -0,740
(1,089)
dum.netdebt 0,123 0,017 0,416 0,428
(0,477) (0,445) (0,377) (0,381)
netdebtta 1,520 0,958 1,155 * 1,102 *
(0,95) (0,657) (0,635) (0,651)
cashta 0,568 0,171 0,360 0,050
(0,848) (0,759) (0,744) (0,791)
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Model 7, which includes all the variables, is statistically significant. From the General 
group, only the Country variable coefficient signal came against expectations and 
contrary to the univariate analysis results. From the P&L group, dumb EBITDA and EBIT 
mg coefficient signal came against expectations. From the Balance Sheet group, Total 
Assets, Total Debt / Total Assets and Cash / Total Assets coefficient signals came against 
expectations, being the last two contrary to the results found in the univariate analysis. In 
this model there are three statistically significant variables which allegedly should have a 
more important role in survival, namely the Issue Price, Total Debt and again the EBIT 
mg issue. The first two already proved their importance both in the univariate and 
multivariate analysis, making sense for a Penny Stock and a more leveraged company to 
have higher propensity to fail. Regarding EBIT mg, the explanation for its result was 
already approached in previous models. In order to refine Model 7, Model 8 was 
developed where the variables Revenues, Total Assets and Total Debt / Total Assets were 
excluded due to possible multicollinearity with other variables (Revenues could also be 
considered a proxy of a company size). Model 8 presented a higher statistical significance, 
(showing a better fit), and so did the variable Total Debt, confirming the results found in 
Model 7. 
Models 9 and 10, both proven statistically significant, include the majority of variables 
with refinements made in P&L and Balance Sheet variables in order to limit 
multicollinearity and to isolate specific effects. The main difference in these models lies 
in the earnings variables, in Model 9 were used EBITDA variables while in Model 10 the 
EBIT variables. In both models the Issue Price appears again as a significant variable, in 
line with previous observations. The variable Net Debt / Total Assets also came 
statistically significant in both models, (an event also confirmed by other models 
developed in the annexes), as in the univariate analysis, reinforcing the idea that more 
leveraged companies are have lower propensity to survive. By isolating earnings in these 
more integrated models P&L variables continued not to present statistical significance, 
confirming their lack of influence. Additionally, by changing the proxy of size variables, 
Revenues instead of Total Debt in comparison between Model 21 (in annexes) and Model 
10, it was found no major difference.  Model 10 presents a slightly better statistical 
significance and also has the variable Net Debt / Total Assets statistical significant.  
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The overall results allowed to obtain several conclusions regarding the impact of the 
analysed variables in company’s survival. Despite constrains in the data and its punctual 
negative effects, it was possible to find several statistical significant information. It was 
clear that the General variables have an important role, as well as the Balance Sheet 
variables. The P&L variables presented the poorest results, suggesting a low impact in 
survival.  
The General variables group presented results fully aligned with expectations in the 
univariate analysis, with two variables statistically significant, Market Cycle and Issue 
Price. In the multivariate analysis results came practically the same, with the exception 
of the variable Country. The statistical significance of the variable Issue Price was 
verified in all the models, confirming definitely its importance in a company’s survival, 
indicating that a penny stock has more propensity to fail. The variable Market Cycle, 
although maintaining the same signal in all the models, it only proved statistical 
significant in the Model 6. Although not such a strong indicator, Market Cycle also 
proved to have an assignable negative influence in a company survival, possibly and 
simply justified by the fact that the majority of IPOs take place in bull markets. 
The P&L variables group presented the most unexpected results, as they indicated a minor 
influence in a company’s survival. In the univariate analysis none of the operational 
rations came in line with expectations, only Revenues (suggesting higher sales have a 
positive impact in survival) and dummy variables (suggesting companies with positive 
earnings have a positive impact in survival) results were in line. Nevertheless, none of the 
variables proved statistical significant. In the multivariate analysis results were similar, 
with the highlight that Model 2 (only with P&L variables) didn’t come statistically 
significant. Surprisingly, the variable EBIT mg appeared statistically significant in some 
of the models. However its influence was discarded with “tailored” models and literature 
background. 
Lastly, the Balance Sheet variables presented a strong set of results, indicating a 
significant effect of leverage in a company’s survival post-IPO. The univariate analysis 
presented all results in line with expectations, with the exception of the variable Total 
Assets, while four variables tested statistically significant. These results showed at first 
sight the importance of Debt for survival, where companies with lower debt, lower 
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financial leverage and positive net cash showed higher propensity for success. The results 
from the multivariate analysis were not so supportive though. Nevertheless the variable 
Total Debt tested statistically significant in several models, as well as the leverage ratio 
Net Debt / Total Assets, casting small doubts on their important impact for survival. 
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5. Conclusion 
An IPO is one of the most important financial marks in the life of a company. The ability 
to finance itself in the equity capital markets is becoming more important every day, 
especially for SMEs as they usually face higher constrains regarding access to capital. 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is one of the most recent, hot and important 
stock markets for SMEs, and especial too as it has very limited listing requirements. The 
literature studying IPOs of SMEs is per se limited, even more for AIM. Taking this into 
consideration, with the objective to understand the drivers for success (assumed just as 
survival in this study) and failure of these companies after the operation, several pre-IPO 
variables were studied to their importance in the success/failure of those companies in 
order to understand whether it can be possible to identify ex-ante if a company has a 
higher propensity to survive or not in the future. 
A sample of 327 IPOs occurred in AIM from 1999 to 2010 was used, tracked for success 
until the end of 2013. Our results indicated that 100% of the companies survive at least 3 
months and that, within the companies who fail, the median survival time is 48 months. 
It was also identified that companies are keener to failure at a faster rate in the short to 
medium term. 
The Cox Hazard models showed that the General variables, such as issue price, market 
cycle, and Balance Sheet variables were the ones who had a more significant impact in 
the company’s survival, while the P&L variables impact came surprisingly irrelevant.  
Within the General variables group the Issue Price variable appears as the most relevant 
variable of the study to impact survival, suggesting that penny stocks have higher 
propensity to fail, possibly due to the fact that these companies are subject to higher 
speculative moves and also associated with smaller and more fragile companies. The 
Market Cycle variable also tested significant, indicating that companies that IPO in bull 
markets have higher propensity to fail. This result is not so relevant, as usually this 
operating takes place only in the bull cycles of the equity market.  
Within the P&L variables it was not found significant impact from any variable in the 
survival of the companies, confirmed both in the uni and multivariate analysis. Despite 
similar findings from some authors, data constrains might have caused a significant bias. 
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Lastly, in the case of Balance Sheet variables, companies with lower debt, lower financial 
leverage and positive net cash showed higher propensity for success. 
In conclusion, our study shows that penny stocks and stocks listing during bull cycles are 
keener to failure, while companies with lower debt and positive net cash show higher 
propensity for success. 
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7. Annexes 
Additional description of the variables used. 
Table 8 – Descriptive statistics of all variables used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable # Observations Average Median Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Type
sector 327 0,92 1,00 0,28 0,00 1,00 dummy
country 327 0,89 1,00 0,31 0,00 1,00 dummy
marketcycle 327 0,88 1,00 0,33 0,00 1,00 dummy
dum.issueprice 327 0,74 1,00 0,44 0,00 1,00 dummy
log.moneyraised 327 0,70 0,70 0,62 -0,70 2,54 dummy
log.revenue 299 2,79 3,39 1,80 0,00 7,47 logarithm
dum.ebitda 321 0,45 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 dummy
ebitdamg 225 -12,70 0,00 74,17 -730,67 25,86 ratio
dum.ebit 317 0,49 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 dummy
ebitmg 221 -12,41 0,04 73,82 -722,11 19,04 ratio
dum.netincome 322 0,41 0,00 0,49 0,00 1,00 dummy
netincomemg 231 -11,89 -0,03 69,97 -701,44 32,21 ratio
log.totalassets 301 4,17 4,15 0,73 1,61 7,16 logarithm
log.totaldebt 301 1,54 0,00 1,79 0,00 7,08 logarithm
totaldebtta 301 0,08 0,00 0,16 0,00 1,14 ratio
dum.netdebt 322 0,26 0,00 0,44 0,00 1,00 dummy
netdebtta 301 -0,31 -0,29 0,39 -1,00 1,04 ratio
cashta 301 0,39 0,34 0,29 0,00 1,00 ratio
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The additional models developed during the present study, along with the comprehensive 
results, are exposed in the Tables 9,10 and 11 bellow. 
Table 9 – Results of multivariate Cox Hazard models analysis (Models 11 to 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
# Observations 221 327 225 231 301 301
# Failures 39 57 40 42 50 50
χ2 25,980 13,220 3,000 2,620 11,360 19,910
pvalue 0,007 *** 0,001 *** 0,391 0,454 0,045 ** 0,001 ***
sector 0,764
(0,75)
country 0,825
(0,816)
marketcycle 0,829 0,724 1,042 *
(0,628) (0,523) (0,603)
dum.issueprice -0,840 ** -0,874 *** -0,791 ***
(0,407) (0,266) (0,286)
log.moneyraised 0,139
(0,312)
log.revenue -0,044 0,084 0,077
(0,198) (0,183) (0,174)
dum.ebitda -0,498
(0,369)
ebitdamg 0,006
(0,009)
dum.ebit -0,416
(0,408)
ebitmg 0,009
(0,015)
dum.netincome -0,496
(0,362)
netincomemg 0,003
(0,006)
log.totalassets -0,050
(0,196)
log.totaldebt 0,197
(0,121)
totaldebtta
dum.netdebt 0,527 -0,146 0,399
(0,383) (0,412) (0,34)
netdebtta 0,977 0,402 0,590 *
(0,638) (0,563) (0,334)
cashta -0,054 -0,141
(0,802) (0,599)
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Table 10 – Results of multivariate Cox Hazard models analysis (Models 17 to 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22
# Observations 301 221 225 221 221 231
# Failures 50 39 40 39 39 42
χ2 18,750 32,790 25,350 31,590 25,980 22,230
pvalue 0,001 *** 0,005 *** 0,021 ** 0,003 *** 0,007 *** 0,023 **
sector 1,365 0,791 1,230 0,764 0,790
(0,971) (0,753) (0,917) (0,75) (0,747)
country 0,851 0,916 0,954 0,825 0,354
(0,837) (0,808) (0,837) (0,816) (0,671)
marketcycle 0,971 0,837 0,886 0,820 0,829 0,985
(0,6) (0,635) (0,624) (0,625) (0,628) (0,618)
dum.issueprice -0,801 *** -0,915 ** -0,973 ** -0,896 ** -0,840 ** -0,867 **
(0,291) (0,413) (0,399) (0,411) (0,407) (0,39)
log.moneyraised 0,122 0,059 0,112 0,139 0,026
(0,32) (0,303) (0,319) (0,312) (0,291)
log.revenue -0,014 -0,058 -0,012 -0,044 -0,092
(0,208) (0,196) (0,209) (0,198) (0,189)
dum.ebitda 0,017 -0,190
(0,989) (0,708)
ebitdamg -0,106 0,017
(0,068) (0,044)
dum.ebit -0,326 -0,307 -0,416
(0,78) (0,576) (0,408)
ebitmg 0,111 ** 0,095 ** 0,009
(0,045) (0,039) (0,015)
dum.netincome -0,063 -0,012 -0,060 -0,148
(0,739) (0,719) (0,571) (0,393)
netincomemg 0,014 -0,015 -0,082 *** 0,002
(0,054) (0,046) (0,027) (0,005)
log.totalassets
log.totaldebt
totaldebtta
dum.netdebt 0,551 0,495 0,545 0,527 0,448
(0,386) (0,38) (0,386) (0,383) (0,368)
netdebtta 0,942 * 1,116 * 1,069 * 1,069 * 0,977 0,916
(0,527) (0,646) (0,627) (0,647) (0,638) (0,616)
cashta 0,262 0,188 0,266 0,120 -0,054 0,248
(0,616) (0,797) (0,753) (0,798) (0,802) (0,73)
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Table 11 – Results of multivariate Cox Hazard models analysis (Models 23 to 29). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29
# Observations 221 225 221 231 301 301 301
# Failures 39 40 39 42 50 50 50
χ2 33,610 25,590 32,460 22,280 8,750 22,550 24,920
pvalue 0,004 *** 0,019 ** 0,002 *** 0,022 ** 0,068 * 0,007 *** 0,003 ***
sector 1,366 0,799 1,232 0,798 0,889 0,904
(0,97) (0,754) (0,915) (0,747) (0,737) (0,736)
country 1,033 1,048 1,123 0,506 -0,070 -0,064
(0,827) (0,802) (0,825) (0,668) (0,475) (0,460)
marketcycle 0,830 0,884 0,815 0,983 1,125 * 1,135 *
(0,634) (0,624) (0,624) (0,618) (0,609) (0,609)
dum.issueprice -0,834 ** -0,922 ** -0,815 * -0,818 ** -0,642 * -0,636 *
(0,424) (0,411) (0,422) (0,402) (0,347) (0,348)
log.moneyraised 0,045 0,007 0,037 -0,029 -0,188 -0,158
(0,331) (0,316) (0,329) (0,305) (0,288) (0,272)
log.revenue
dum.ebitda 0,046 -0,202
(0,987) (0,705)
ebitdamg -0,102 0,018
(0,066) (0,044)
dum.ebit -0,378 -0,349
(0,779) (0,573)
ebitmg 0,110 ** 0,094 **
(0,044) (0,038)
dum.netincome -0,137 -0,105 -0,120 -0,284
(0,722) (0,702) (0,556) (0,358)
netincomemg 0,010 -0,016 -0,082 *** 0,001
(0,053) (0,046) (0,027) (0,004)
log.totalassets 0,198 0,122 0,203 0,114 0,084 0,112
(0,215) (0,215) (0,214) (0,212) (0,180) (0,183)
log.totaldebt 0,180 *
(0,106)
totaldebtta
dum.netdebt 0,465 0,417 0,457 0,364 0,252 0,385 0,011
(0,384) (0,378) (0,384) (0,368) (0,350) (0,354) (0,414)
netdebtta 1,235 * 1,139 * 1,195 * 0,972 0,638 0,961 * 0,732
(0,66) (0,638) (0,66) (0,627) (0,545) (0,588) (0,580)
cashta 0,282 0,337 0,222 0,323 -0,056 0,445 0,373
(0,788) (0,749) (0,789) (0,726) (0,610) (0,661) (0,630)
